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Abstract.  This paper reconnects the personal and the biological by extending the 
reach of parental causality.  First, it argues that the reproductive act is profitably 
understood in personal terms as an “invitation” to new life and that the egg and 
sperm are “ambassadors” or “delegates,” because they represent the potential 
mother and father and are naturally endowed with causal powers to bring about 
motherhood and fatherhood, two of the most significant roles a person may have.  
Second, it argues that even though God alone can create a spiritual soul, the 
human parents are not just the causes of their child’s body; they are the secondary 
causes of the whole child.  In this way, God acts as a kind of “sponsor” who 
enables the acceptance of the invitation issued by the parents, and he accepts it on 
behalf of the new human person that comes to be thanks to their invitation. 
 
 
“Now Adam knew Eve his wife, and 
she conceived and bore Cain, saying 
‘I have gotten a man with the help of 
the Lord.’” (Genesis 4:1, RSV-CE) 
 
In one of the more colorful matters of philosophical biography, we know that on October 
15, 1634, Descartes fathered a child with a maid named Helena Jans.
1
  He made notations that 
day predicting the conception of a child as a result of the act, and nine months later his daughter 
Francine was born.  His adventure in biological experimentation had a lasting personal 
significance, and the untimely death of Francine at the age of five proved to be a cause of great 
sorrow for her devoted father.
2
  In the Third Meditation, Descartes says that parental efficient 
causality is limited to the production of the body.  He writes that “insofar as I am a thinking 
thing, [my parents] did not even make me; they merely placed certain dispositions in the matter 
which I have always regarded as containing me, or rather my mind, for that is all I now take 
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myself to be.”3  In this way, the personal significance of his fathering Francine lacks theoretical 
support in his writings.  He remains merely one of two biological contributors to Francine’s 
impersonal biology.  In what follows, I wish to overcome this dualism of the personal and the 
biological and to spell out the personal and composite meaning of human sexual reproduction 
and, in doing so, explain why we are justified in speaking of human sexual reproduction in 
personal terms as procreation.  
The two inter-related beliefs that denigrate the significance of human sexual reproduction 
are (1) thinking of human biology in impersonal terms and (2) thinking that parents are the cause 
of the body and not the soul.
4
  I argue that, rightly understood, human biology and divine 
creation in fact enrich the personal significance of parental causality.  In making my case, I 
restrict my consideration to the meaning of sexual reproduction.  I do not discuss the meaning of 
sexuality in its own right, nor do I discuss related topics such as love and marriage.  Looking at 
reproduction, I cast a backward glance at the sexual act that led to it.  While reproduction has 
ethical ramifications, I limit this paper to an investigation of its intrinsic meaning as an issue for 
philosophical anthropology: What is distinctive about human sexual reproduction that warrants 
us calling it “procreation”?5 
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St. Thomas Aquinas provides the backdrop to my project.  He expresses the personal 
significance of the body in metaphysical terms: “Having more potentiality than other intellectual 
substances, the human soul is so close to matter that a material reality is induced to share its 
own being, so that from soul and body there results one being in the one composite, though this 
being, as belonging to the soul, does not depend on the body.”6  Because the intellectual soul is 
the substantial form of the body, it virtually contains within it animal powers of perception and 
animate powers of metabolism and reproduction.  By consequence, even metabolism and sexual 
reproduction are, in the case of human beings, expressions of the one intellective soul.  In a 
word, they are personal.  Aquinas has the right principles for this topic; it is just a matter of 
developing the concrete employment of them in a genuinely personalistic way.  At the same 
time, I prescind from historical questions concerning the thought of Aquinas.
7
  Mine is a 
speculative rather than historical venture.  In approaching the issue, I assume four theses: 
(a) Anthropology: The human being is a composite of soul and body.8 
(b) Hylomorphism: The spiritual soul is the form of the body.9 
(c) Personalism: The person is an intelligent and free being with spiritual significance.10 
(d) Immediate creation: The human soul, being immaterial and subsistent, must be 
created by God alone.
11
 
 
In light of these principles, I pose two questions: 
(1) Granting theses a, b, and c, what is the personal significance of the biology of human 
reproduction? 
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(2) Granting theses a, b, c, and d, what is the personal significance of parental efficient 
causality? 
 
I argue in the first three sections of the paper that the sexual act is best construed along personal 
lines as an “invitation” to new life and that the sex cells from the respective mother and father 
are as it were “ambassadors” or “delegates” that naturally bear this meaning in virtue of their 
causal powers.  In the second three sections, I will argue that even though God alone can create a 
spiritual soul, human parents do not just cause their offspring’s body to be.  Rather they are the 
cause of the whole person, because their reproductive causality naturally avails itself of God’s 
creative completion of their act.   
 
I. THE SEXUAL ACT AS AN INVITATION TO MOTHERHOOD AND FATHERHOOD  
The sexual act has a unique kind of causality, which distinguishes it from other modes of 
efficient causality, and this for two reasons.  First, the sexual act and the coming-to-be of a child 
are in fact separate events.  Authoring a book and a book’s being authored, making a cake and a 
cake’s being made are single events analyzable into a causing and a being caused, but having sex 
and a child’s coming-to-be are temporally distinct events.  David Hume’s analysis of efficient 
causality in terms of two events customarily conjoined has limited applicability here, for we do 
genuinely have two temporally distinct events.  But of course even here Hume is wrong, for the 
two events are in fact causally linked.  In the sexual act, the parents afford the occasion for a 
child to come to be.  They are consequently responsible for the coming-to-be of the child.  A 
second difference emerges here.  What the would-be parents directly cause is a possibility; had 
they not had sex it would have been impossible for a child to come to be, impossible for them to 
become mother and father to the same child.  In having sex, they make possible this entwined 
reality: the advent of a child and the assignment of the personal roles, mother and father.  But 
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this possibility in no way entails actuality.  The coming-to-be of the child rests on factors 
extrinsic to their decision to engage in the sexual act and is therefore not, strictly speaking, 
within their determining power.  The woman’s cycle and the man’s sperm count are just two 
such factors.  In having sex, the would-be parents dispose themselves to the possibility of a new 
life coming to be, a new life that would make them mother and father to the same child.  They 
perform an action that makes possible the coming-to-be of a child.   
I propose calling this making possible an “invitation,” to make manifest the latent 
personal meaning of the act whereby the would-be-parents dispose themselves to the possibility 
of their child’s coming-to-be.12  We speak in personal terms of inviting people to a wedding 
party, a birthday party, or a dinner party.  In issuing the invitation, the hosts ask someone to be 
their guest at some celebratory event, which typically celebrates the communion of persons in 
one way or another.  Issuing the invitation makes it possible for those invited to become guests, 
but this making-possible does not make-actual; it does not lie within the power of the host to 
decide who will attend, only to decide who may attend.  Analogously, would-be parents become 
would-be hosts by engaging in the sexual act which in effect issues an invitation to a would-be 
child, whether or not it should be accepted.  Of course, unlike an ordinary invitation, what is 
proposed is not an issue of place alone: please come to our home from yours.  What is proposed 
is rather the coming-to-be of a person, substance and all: please come to be in our home.  The 
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invitation is extended simultaneously to (a) the child that may come to be and (b) the mother and 
the father of the child that may come to be.  Let me discuss each in turn. 
 (a) The act itself, regardless of one’s intentions in engaging it, invites new life to come to 
be as its natural result.  Just as it is in a host’s power to invite someone to a party but not in their 
power to determine whether the person will in fact come, so it is not in the power of the would-
be parents to determine whether a new person will in fact come to be as the result of the sexual 
act.  Nevertheless, an invitation is an invitation in virtue of its being extended, not in virtue of its 
being accepted.  Nor does issuing an invitation necessarily mean that we want it accepted.  
Consider the sorts of invitations we might feel socially obliged to make, for example to an 
obnoxious boss or boorish relatives.  Though we issue such invitations we might hope they are 
not accepted.  At the same time, in those cases that they are accepted we have to acknowledge 
that the recipients were invited, however insincerely.  Invitations exercise a causality in virtue of 
being offered, not in virtue of the intentions behind the offering.
13
  The seventeen-year-old St. 
Augustine and his unnamed lover found themselves parents to Adeodatus “contrary to their 
intention.”14  They invited new life by freely engaging in the act, not by means of the intention 
that led them to engage in the act.   
(b) The couple issues the invitation to a potential offspring and simultaneously they issue 
an invitation to each other: the man invites the woman to be the mother of the invited child and 
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reciprocally the woman invites the man to be the father of the invited child.
15
  The roles “father” 
and “mother” are relative terms.  No one is a father in general but always a father to someone in 
particular.  Thus, each time another child comes to be, one becomes a father or a mother afresh.  
Each child gives us our fatherhood or motherhood again.  Consequently, the advent of each child 
further entwines the personal identities of the father and mother, and familial roles are 
irrevocable.  One can always end a friendship; neighbors can move away; and co-workers can 
retire or find employment elsewhere.  But familial roles are enduring: once one is a mother one 
cannot cease to be one, even if one’s child should die.16  Thus the invitation offers to the man 
and the woman something personal and lasting.  Aristotle notes that the child is a good common 
to each, but this is not specific enough.
17
  The child is not just a common good; he or she is a 
personal good that establishes lasting reciprocal roles between the mother and the father.   
 To invite another to participate in human life and to invite another to participate with you 
in rearing that life constitutes a radical celebration of and affirmation of the goodness of life.  It 
is, in this respect, very much like inviting someone to a party.  Human life, as Aristotle observed, 
is different from mere animal association, because it is constituted by shared beliefs about the 
world rooted in the power of speech to represent.
18
 To bring a child up is not simply a matter of 
helping the child successfully navigate his or her biological environment; to bring up a child 
entails immersing the child in a personal world with a given language, a given culture, and 
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beliefs about what is right, holy, and good.  To invite a child to come to be is to affirm human 
life but also the particularity of the human life one enjoys and can share, jubilantly, with one’s 
offspring.  Naturally, there is much about any given person’s situation that is not cause for 
celebration; still, to reproduce is to affirm the essential goodness of one’s way of life, despite or 
even in the face of, one’s undesirable but accidental conditions.  The man and woman, by issuing 
an invitation to new life and thereby to each other as father and mother, at the same time affirm 
not only the physical desirability of each other but also the goodness of each other’s way of life 
and the principles that guide it.  The would-be father says in effect: I affirm not only the maternal 
capacities of your body but the essentials of your human way of life; the would-be mother says 
in effect: I affirm not only the paternal capacities of your body but the essentials of your human 
way of life.  I want to share that way of life with you and whatever children may come to be. 
When someone sends out an invitation to a party, the would-be host means that the 
recipient is welcome to attend; the arrival of the guest, of course, calls for the host to marshal his 
or her resources to make the guest feel at home: mi casa es su casa.
19
  It is possible, then, to 
distinguish the act of issuing an invitation from the act of welcoming the one invited.  Hans 
Jonas approaches the relation between the issuance of the invitation and the reception of the 
child with considerable sobriety: “The radical insufficiency of the begotten as such carries with it 
the mandate to the begetters to avert its sinking back into nothing and to tend its further 
becoming.  The pledge thereto was implicit in the act of generation.”20  Issuing an invitation 
promises that the invitee will be welcomed. 
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What about the uninvited guest?  An authentic reception implies that although the guest 
was not invited he or she is welcome; the factual lack of an invitation has the status of an 
accident or oversight.  For example, Agathon tells Socrates’ uninvited companion in the 
Symposium, “Welcome, Aristodemus! What perfect timing! You’re just in time for dinner! I 
hope you’re not here for any other reason—if you are, forget it.  I looked all over for you 
yesterday, so I could invite you, but I couldn’t find you anywhere.”21  The welcomed guest is 
implicitly invited whether or not an invitation was issued or received.  One in fact only insists on 
having received an invitation when one is made to feel unwelcome by the gatekeepers to the 
affair.   In the case of adoption, the adoptive parents invite a child to come and live with them 
and accept responsibility for that child’s well-being.  The child already came to be thanks to the 
invitation of the natural parents; here the adoptive parents fulfill the natural meaning of the act 
whereby the child came to be by affirming that the child is welcome to be.  Their welcome, like 
Agathon’s welcome of Aristodemus, ratifies the invitation issued by someone else: We would 
have invited you to be had we been able to, and we are terribly glad you have been invited to be 
by someone else. 
Why regard only the human sexual act as an invitation and not all animal sexual acts in 
general?  After all, I have emphasized that the act solicits new life quite independently of the 
intentions of the participants.  Why not acknowledge that kangaroos and chimpanzees equally 
“invite” new life?  The reason is twofold.  First, only in the case of a human reproduction is the 
invitation addressed to another person; invitations to parties are addressed to people.  An 
invitation offers itself to a free being who is subsequently free to accept or decline.  Now, in this 
peculiar case, the invitee does not decide for himself or herself whether to accept, but in the 
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course of his or her life, the child can after the fact second the acceptance of the invitation and 
thank his or her parents for welcoming him or her into the world.  Second, only in the case of 
human reproduction is the invitation issued by a human person, who, knowing the basics of the 
birds and the bees, can accept the natural meaning of the act as constituting a kind of invitation.
22
  
Only the human person has an intellect and will, so only the human person can know the 
meaning of an act and will it accordingly.   
   
II. THE SPERM AND THE EGG AS AMBASSADORS WITH DELEGATED AUTHORITY 
Even on the biological level, there is a reciprocal causality between the man and woman 
at work.  The sperm at ejaculation are not yet capable of fertilizing an egg; they have to spend 
time within the female’s reproductive tract in order for capacitation to occur.  The sperm need 
the female environment in order for their biological potentiality to be activated.  Similarly, the 
egg of the female is in an arrested state of development, but, as soon as one sperm penetrates it, 
there is egg activation; among other things, a sudden release of free calcium brings about the 
completion of the second meiotic division in the egg, making half its genetic code ready to be 
united with the genetic code from the sperm; the extra other half will in time degenerate.
23
  On 
the biological level, then, there is a causal reciprocity between the man and woman: sperm need 
the woman’s environment to be capacitated, and the egg needs the man’s sperm to be activated.  
Together, the man’s sperm and the woman’s egg can and do bring about new human life, but the 
causal capacities they enjoy (and not just their exercise) are enabled by the presence of one to the 
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other.  The reciprocity between man and woman that plays out on the biological level mirrors the 
reciprocity that plays out on the personal level in which each invites the other to be parent to the 
same child.   
In view of the hylomorphic unity of the human person, I propose we regard human 
biology in personal terms, and to do so, I would like to take a page from Plato’s playbook in the 
Republic, and propose the fittingness of political terms for shedding light on the personal.  Now, 
in political terms, ambassadors are freely sent by proper authorities from one country to another 
where they are appropriately received as representatives of their native countries; they are not 
just from their native country; they are empowered to act in its name.  Analogously, I think the 
sperm act as the representatives or ambassadors of the man on the biological level, and, in turn, 
the egg acts as the representative or ambassador of the woman on the biological level.  Just as the 
ambassador of a nation acts with the authority of the nation as a whole, so the sperm and egg are 
authorized to act with the authority of the man and of the woman.  The sperm and egg are 
naturally sent to meet one another, and if and when they do, their meeting bears with it the 
personal intention of each parent as embodied in the sexual act itself.  The sperm and egg 
represent the personal act in the biological realm.  Sperm capacitation would name the fact that 
an ambassador is only an ambassador when received into a foreign country in which it is 
empowered to act; ambassadors have no power to represent when they are in their home country 
or when they are somewhere other than where they have been empowered to act.  Similarly, egg 
activation would name the fact that the presence of an ambassador instigates the authorization of 
someone to receive him.  The reciprocity on the biological level reflects the reciprocity on the 
personal.  The ability to become a father is itself a gift from a woman to a man and the ability to 
become a mother is itself a gift from a man to a woman. 
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The sperm and the egg, as reciprocally enabled ambassadors, are authorized in virtue of 
being sent one to the other to bring about a new human person.  They bear the invitation issued 
by the parents.  Their meeting and fusion brings about a new human substance that exceeds the 
capacities of either the sperm or the egg on their own and that amounts to something more than 
the mere merging of their causal capacities; together they bring about a new human person that 
will, given the appropriate conditions, come to exercise all the capacities inherent in the human 
nature he or she enjoys.  Neither the sperm nor the egg is a human person; they are ambassadors 
of human persons; but the being they are empowered to bring about is a human person.  The 
result of their fusion is not just another organism but another person.  As both Aristotle and 
Levinas point out, the child is “a second self” to the parents.24  Just as friendship widens one’s 
own self by adopting the good of another as one’s own, so parenting, brought about through the 
causality of the sperm and egg uniting, widens one’s own selfhood by identifying another’s own 
good as one’s own by virtue of having caused him or her to be.  This new self that comes to be 
comes to be thanks to the personal powers harbored by the sperm and the egg.   
Let me spell out the analogy a little more.  Consider the way the international space 
station came about.  To simplify things, let’s reduce the participating counties to two, the U.S. 
and Russia.  Vice President Al Gore, representing the United States, and Prime Minister Viktor 
S. Chernomyrdin, representing Russia, together established something new, independent of 
either country: a joint international space station.
25
 They could do so because they had the power 
to act in the name of the whole.  The biological ambassadors of the man and the woman similarly 
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sent together bring about something new that is independent of either parent.  The difference 
here is that this new life is more than a new joint operation; it is more like a new country, 
capable, in time, of dispatching its own representatives. 
 The personal causality enjoyed by the sex cell works quite independently of the purposes 
of the people involved.  The cells are authorized in virtue of being sent, whatever the reason may 
have been that they were sent.  Suppose a married couple celebrating a recent promotion 
unintentionally gets drunk.  While sloshed, they have sex only later to discover that the act led to 
the conception of a child.  Clearly, they did not intend to have a child, for they did not even set 
out to have sex.  Whatever their intention might have been, however, they engaged in the kind of 
activity whose natural meaningfulness constitutes an invitation to new life.  They still dispatched 
their biological ambassadors to form, if possible, a new human life.  They are still assigned the 
personal roles of mother and father to a new child thanks, in part, to the causality operative on 
the biological level.  Because the human being as a whole is personal, biological activity is 
personal even apart from an explicit purpose designed to make it so.  No matter the specific 
purposes of the agents, the act they engage in issues an invitation that may or may not be 
accepted.  The biological ambassadors are authorized to act simply in virtue of being sent. 
 
III. A NOTE ON ANTHROPOMORPHISM 
About terms such as “ambassador” and “delegate” we are tempted to say they are 
anthropomorphic and so out of place in the realm of biology, but it must be remembered that our 
subject is none other than the anthropos, the human person, on various levels, so there can be no 
such thing as a misplaced anthropomorphism.  Of course, other perils remain for such a 
speculative endeavor.  There can be a part-whole fallacy in which the properties of the whole are 
ascribed to a part; an Olympian can be a good runner but the fingernail of an Olympian cannot 
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be.  In this case, the sex cell has different powers than the whole which produced it; it cannot do 
addition or subtraction, for example.  It can, however, uniquely accomplish a deeply personal 
deed: human generation.  The power of the whole person to reproduce is instantiated in precisely 
this part.  Therefore, to regard sex cells in personal terms is not to fall prey to the part-whole 
fallacy.   
The sex cells represent each person to each other.  Consider the difference between an 
American tourist in Italy and an American ambassador in Italy.  The behavior of the former 
might reflect favorably or poorly on America, but the tourist is nonetheless not capable of acting 
in the name of America.  The ambassador, however, is not just a citizen but a representative, who 
can exercise genuine causality and can be received as such.  The sex cell, like the ambassador 
and unlike the tourist, can exercise causality in the name of the would-be parent.  A piece of hair 
might be taken as a token of a person and treasured accordingly.  A fingerprint or drop of blood 
might serve as a trace of someone.  These are pieces of one that indicate someone but do not 
represent someone.  But the sex cells are not only traces of someone.  They are causally 
efficacious in a particular way insofar as they are geared in their natures to bringing about a new 
human person.  They therefore differ from other cells dispatched into the world.  They are 
ambassadors rather than tourists.   
Why do we resist the application of personal terms to human biology?  Why does it seem 
unscientific to do so?  The answer, I submit, is that we are captivated by the Cartesian idea of 
nature as res extensa.  According to Descartes, an animal works in virtue of the mechanical 
forces in play; there is no need to posit a soul as animating principle.  In this vein, the 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio bemoans the fact that Descartes “persuaded biologists to adopt, 
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to this day, clockwork mechanics as a model for life processes.”26  The geneticist Richard 
Lewontin says the Descartes’ clock metaphor informs “the entire body of modern science.”27  
Under the spell of Descartes, we think we are being scientific when we regard human biology in 
impersonal, mechanical terms that are species-neutral.
28
  Granting that such an approach can 
uncover valuable information about how human biology works, it is nonetheless the case that 
such an approach leaves out what is most important.  If we want to understand human biology as 
human biology we cannot bracket the specifically human; we cannot leave out the world of 
persons.  Of course, we might not want to count the application of personal terms to human 
biology as a contribution to modern biology, which seems methodologically committed to 
Cartesian principles; instead we can count it as a contribution to the philosophical understanding 
of what it means to be human. 
 
IV. ORIGINS OF THE WHOLE OFFSPRING   
Aristotle saw parents and the divine operate in an allied manner: “The friendship of 
children to parents, and of men to gods, is a relation to them as to something good and superior; 
for they have conferred the greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their being and of their 
nourishment, and of their education from their birth.”29  When we move from a pagan to a 
specifically theistic conception of the divine, this joint responsibility remains.  God the Creator 
does not dilute parental causality; he enhances it.  The parents operate together with the creator 
to be responsible for the whole human child.  In this section, I want to work out a way for us to 
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think about the contribution of the parents in personal terms; they do not just cause the body to 
be, for they are the cause of the whole human being.  My task here is to propose a way of 
thinking about the interface of the human and divine contribution in the genesis of another 
human person.  Naturally, the causality of any secondary cause is due to the primary cause; the 
causality I am assigning to human parents does not compete with divine causality.  My question 
is not how a secondary cause and a primary cause can be the cause of the same effect.  Rather, I 
want to know how something that can be accomplished on the level of secondary causality 
interfaces with something that can occur only on the primary level.  How does something God 
can as it were delegate become one with an act that cannot be so delegated?  
 On this question, Karl Rahner and Norris Clarke each see part of the truth.  Rahner, 
emphasizing God’s transcendent causality as sustainer of existence, denies any difference 
between the process whereby a person comes to be and the process whereby any other animal 
comes to be.  The difference, rather, lies in the term of the production.  Robert North ably 
summarizes Rahner’s views as follows: 
The parents produce a human being.  And God produces the human being.  Each exerts 
the causality of its own order.  ...  God is truly and immediately the creator of the human 
“soul” or life-principle of the living being.  Essentially his activity here is the same as in 
his production of new animal or inorganic being; but the special term “creation” is 
applied because of the dignity of its end product.
30
 
 
The parents, on this view, are the secondary causes of the whole human being without remainder.  
Clarke recoils before Rahner’s suggestion, because he thinks it undermines the spiritual character 
of the human person and because it suggests that human parents, hours or in fact days after 
having sex, are causing to be another human person even though they may be sleeping, golfing, 
                                                          
30
 Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1967), 239.  Rahner 
wrote the forward to the book. 
17 
 
or watching television, and he finds this unseemly.  Instead, Clarke proposes that parents cause 
the body alone: 
Now the production of a new human child, endowed with an immortal spiritual soul, is 
the direct collaboration of both earth and heaven: of earth through the body that the 
parents have prepared as the highest point of the evolutionary thrust of the material world 
coming up from below; of heaven by the direct, loving collaboration of the Creator 
himself, introducing the realm of spirit into matter in this most unique of all creatures, an 
embodied spirit.
31
 
 
Clarke is right that Rahner compromises the specific character of the human person in 
assimilating its mode of production to any other event in creation.  But Clarke is wrong on two 
counts.  First, he neglects the specific character of human reproduction as an invitation.  The 
personal intention of the invitation occurs when it is issued, not when it is accepted, so it is not at 
all unseemly that the parents should be oblivious to the precise moment of its acceptance.  
Second, parental causality must somehow extend to the whole child, and this for several reasons.  
Let me spell out why I take this to be. 
 Aquinas sensibly maintains that divine causation does not compete with creaturely 
agency: “God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.”32  But 
the proper operation of all living beings includes the ability to reproduce their own kind.  If 
people cannot reproduce people, they lack an operation proper to living beings.
33
  On Clarke’s 
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view, human parents would exercise less causality for their offspring than would pigs for their 
piglets, because the boar and sow are not just the cause of the piglet’s body but of the animating 
principle of the body as well.  Second, a living body does not exist independently of its living 
form or soul.  Therefore, parents can only cause the flesh on the condition that God 
simultaneously creates a human spirit to animate it, and, ordinarily God creates a human spirit to 
animate a body only on the condition that human parents are making their contribution.
34
  Since 
God and the parents both provide necessary conditions for human generation, the child that 
comes to be owes its undivided existence both to God and to his or her parents.  Third, the 
responsibility and authority to educate offspring is a direct consequence of the causality of the 
parents in the act of procreation.  The responsibility and authority to educate extends to spiritual 
matters (parents do not just feed and potty train; they should introduce the true, the good, and the 
beautiful).  Therefore, their causality must extend to the whole human person.  Fourth, with the 
advent of the child, the issuers of the invitation become a father and a mother, two of the most 
significant personal roles one can enjoy; these roles, as we have seen, are relative, insofar as one 
is mother to a particular child, but this relativity must be grounded in the personhood of the 
offspring.  Parents are not, as it were, foster parents of the human persons that are their children; 
they enjoy the personal roles of father and mother because they are the father and mother of the 
whole human person that comes to be.  For all these reasons, parental causality in reproduction 
must somehow extend to the whole person, spirit included. 
 
V. THE ORDINARY PRIMARY COMPLETION OF A SECONDARY ACT 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dispositive and perfective causes in the effect produced.  It is in this way that parents, as dispositive 
causes, are responsible for the coming to be of the whole child. 
34
 I do not wish to suggest that God could not create a human being independent of other human beings 
only that he ordinarily does not do so. 
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Let’s say two brothers, Noah and Isaac, are in the woods and a bear begins to attack 
Isaac.  Noah swings his gun around, aims, and shoots the bear dead.  Isaac thanks him for killing 
the bear and saving his life.  Noah replies, “I did not kill the bear, for that was beyond my power.  
Rather, the gun killed the bear.”  Isaac would think he was not taking the credit that was due him, 
for he is the one who wielded the gun, aimed, and fired; without him, the bear would not have 
died.  Analogously, we can say that the human parents are causes of the whole human being even 
though God alone creates the immaterial human spirit, for the parents avail themselves of God’s 
creative completion of the invitation they issue.  The parents are able to make use of a power 
greater than their natural power in such a way that they are still the agents of the act, just as the 
hunter is still the agent when he fires a gun.  God takes up and completes the contributions of the 
human parents.  He enables them to exercise their parental causality.   
I do not wish to suggest, of course, that God is as it were an instrument of parental 
causality.  In this respect, the analogy with the gun fails.  Rather, God as creator is the primary 
agent and in the exercise of his causality he enables other agents to be and to exercise their 
proper agency.  Paradoxically, human parents naturally reproduce by virtue of a personal agency 
that exceeds the capacities of their own natures.  Aquinas confronts a similar paradox in the case 
of human happiness.  By nature we are capable of achieving happiness even though this lies 
beyond our power, because we are endowed with the freedom with which we might turn to God 
and be made happy.  He writes: 
Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with 
weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him reason and 
hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in 
things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this 
it could not do.  But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may 
make him happy.  As Aristotle writes, “For what we do by means of our friends, is done, 
in a sense, by ourselves.”35  
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God the Creator is not an impersonal instrument for parental causality; he is the ever faithful 
friend whose agency naturally completes the agency of human nature.  Humans freely invite a 
new life by virtue of engaging in the act that dispatches their representatives, and God can and 
does complete their action by bringing about a new human being, which includes something they 
naturally could not cause, an immortal soul.  Just as happiness is our natural end even though it 
can be accomplished only through divine agency, so parental efficient causality of the whole 
human being is natural to human sexual reproduction.  Divine friendship brings human parental 
causality to its natural completion.   
The invocation of friendship here might appear foreign to the sobriety of metaphysical 
considerations, but the God which functions in the question of this section is the God of theism.  
Aristotle’s deistic divinity impossible to befriend or the pagan understanding of whimsical 
divinities manipulated through sacrifices do not function in this conception at all.  God is the 
creator, who is eternal, wise, and loving.  Friendship designates the fact that the creator wills the 
good of the human person.  In creating a creature, he wills the good of that creature.  For 
humans, the good includes that each should enjoy existence thanks to human parents and that 
some might be able to enjoy the personal roles of mothers and fathers.   
We may be tempted to think of God’s creation of the human soul as a miracle.  Indeed, if 
one defines “miracle” as any effect that cannot be accomplished save by God alone, then creation 
itself and the creation of the human soul in particular is a miracle.  Ordinarily, however, we think 
of a miracle as something that happens occasionally outside the ordinary course of nature.  And 
in this case, God’s creation of the human soul is not a miracle.  Rather it belongs to the ordinary 
course of nature.  Every time a sperm and egg successfully fuse, every time a human being 
comes to be, God creates its human soul.  The God of theism does not hesitate as it were at the 
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moment of fertilization: shall this a human being I make?  His sovereignty over human 
generation comes through providence over the factors of fertilization (including the meeting of 
the two parents) not over whether or not fertilization will involve the infusion of a rational soul.  
That happens as a matter of course.  Rahner objects that “however much the normality of this is 
stressed, it assumes a miraculous appearance.”36  Rahner’s worry can be addressed by noting that 
the appearance in this case is deceptive, and it does not warrant denying the specificity of the 
human mode of production.  The naturalness of God’s creative causality concerning the advent 
of a new human person is akin to the naturalness of divine illumination (independent of course as 
to whether or not this account of necessary truths is true).  It is natural or part of the regular 
workings of things without being able to be accounted for fully in terms of secondary causality.   
 I can formulate this view in the following theses: 
(a) God is the sole cause of the human spirit. 
(b) Humans are secondary causes for the whole human being. 
(c) To reconcile a and b, we can say: human efficient causality naturally (and 
necessarily) is completed by divine causation, so to issue the invitation for a new life 
to come to be constitutes being the secondary efficient cause for the whole human 
being that may come to be through God’s primary causality. 
 
VI. GOD AS SPONSOR FOR THE INVITATION AND SURROGATE FOR ITS ACCEPTANCE   
Human parents are the human cause of the whole being of their offspring, even though 
the creation of the human spirit (itself the soul of the body) exceeds their natural causality.  God 
regularly takes up and completes their causality, such that to be a human parent means to 
participate in a power that is more than human, but to so participate in something more than 
human is a natural ability characteristic of being human.  In this way, the invitation 
accomplished in the sexual union is not only addressed to a potential child; it is simultaneously 
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issued to the creator who would cooperate in bringing that child into existence.  The creator here 
would be a kind of sponsor of the child, enabling the child to accept the invitation.  God as 
sponsor enables the parental invitation to be fulfilled and what the parents invite by their act is 
not just a body but a human being, a body-soul composite.  Parents do not create the spiritual 
soul of their offspring, but their invitation does cause to be the whole human child, including his 
or her spiritual soul, thanks to the sponsorship of the creator.   
Let me draw out the meaning of sponsorship.  A corporate sponsor, for example, might 
bring about an exhibition at the local natural history museum.  But this sponsorship makes 
possible the causality of the exhibit designers, who are the ones who choose the topic and 
develop the displays.  The sponsor provides only the necessary means for their specific causality 
to be realized.  The sponsor does not compromise but enables their responsibility for the exhibit.  
Again, consider the role of sponsors for Olympic teams and other sporting events.  We do not 
say that the sponsor wins the gold or that the medalist did not act on his or her own power 
because of the sponsorship.  Instead, while acknowledging the genuine and non-negligible 
sponsorship, we nonetheless celebrate the genuine and non-negligible achievement of the 
Olympian.  Similarly, God’s sponsorship of the parental invitation has to do with affording them 
the resources to fulfill the invitation issued by their agency.   
In the order of nature, fertilization is a chance event requiring the delivery of a capable 
delegation from the father and the availability of an ambassador from the mother.  But God, 
outside the order of nature, is in a position to orchestrate chance events without compromising 
their contingency.
37
  In this way, we can say that God accepts the invitation on behalf of the child 
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that comes to be.  Due to the character of the invitation which proposes the very genesis of a 
being, the being in question cannot willingly accept the invitation except after the fact.
38
  God, 
providentially orchestrating chance causes, is the only agent positioned to accept the invitation 
before the fact, and he does so on behalf of the child that comes to be.  Parents invite a child to 
come to be; God can do something they cannot: he can choose that the invitation be accepted by 
willing this child to be.  He creates each human person and creates each in its radical 
individuality as a person.  Later, this child can will that it is good for him or her to be and in 
doing so he or she appropriates the original divine acceptance.  She can thank her parents for 
their invitation and either implicitly or explicitly God for its possibility and acceptance.  God the 
creator acts as a sponsor for the parents’ invitation and a surrogate for the child’s acceptance.  
His is a causality that enables people to be and to exercise genuine personal causality.   
Several descriptions from the Confessions shed light on my claim.  Augustine points out 
that neither his mother nor his wet nurses filled their own breasts.  God, author of nature and 
human nature, sustainer of these women’s existences, is the one ultimately responsible for the 
fact that the infant Augustine was welcomed and nurtured: “For the good which came to me from 
them was a good for them; yet it was not from them but through them.”39  The activity of any 
secondary cause can be attributed primarily to the creator.  However, when it comes to 
generation, Augustine calls Patricius and Monica “the parents of my flesh, him from whom and 
her in whom you formed me in time.”40  Augustine is right to see generation as a special case, for 
no secondary cause can create a human person.  However, as I have argued, Augustine here 
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unnecessarily restricts parental causality.
41
  Monica and Patricius issued an invitation that a child 
may come to be, and God the providential creator made it possible for the invitation to be 
accepted.  Indeed, at the close of Book IX, Augustine asks the reader to pray for his parents, 
“through whose flesh [per quorum carnem] you brought me into this life.”42  Insofar as the 
advent of the child comes as the fulfillment of an invitation freely issued by freely engaging in 
the sexual act, the child owes its whole existence to its parents, for they were the ones that asked 
God to create and provided the opportunity for that to occur.  Now, this parental act of invitation 
is something that, occurring on the secondary level, can be attributed primarily to the creator as 
well, but just as his nurses really did provide milk for the infant Augustine, so Monica and 
Patricius really did issue the invitation.  God accepted the invitation and used it as an occasion to 
create Augustine in particular.   
In making us human persons (and not angels), God at the same time gives us a genealogy, 
rich with personal and indeed spiritual significance for parent and child alike.  Consider the 
anguish of Monica over Augustine’s fall and the reassurance given her by a bishop: “Go away 
from me: as you live, it cannot be that the son of these tears should perish.”43  To be is to owe 
thanks both to the God who chooses for each of us to be and to our parents who issue the 
occasion for that choice to be exercised.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Human sexual reproduction is personally significant biologically and metaphysically.  
Biologically, insofar as the marital act itself, irrespective of the intentions to engage in the act, 
                                                          
41
 This restriction may be due to an uncertainty on his part concerning whether or not the soul pre-exists 
conception.  See Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1987), 15-20 and 199-203.  If the soul did pre-exist, then the act of creation and the act of reproduction would be 
separate and unrelated events and the parents would be causes of the body alone. 
42
 Confessions, 9.13.37.  Translation modified. 
43
 Confessions, 3.12.21. 
25 
 
constitutes an invitation to potential new life.  In the act, the spouses simultaneously invite each 
other to be mother or father to the invited child.  In this way, the gametes of the man and the 
woman are agents of the invitation; they are ambassadors with the delegated authority to bring 
about the acceptance of the invitation.  Metaphysically, insofar as God serves as the sponsor to 
bring about the completion of the issued invitation by creating and infusing a rational soul each 
time fertilization occurs, and insofar as God alone is in a position to accept the invitation on 
behalf of the child.  In this way, the parents are responsible for the advent of the whole child as a 
body-soul composite even though the being of the child exceeds their own natural causality.  
When they welcome a child into their midst they ratify the original invitation whereby the child 
came to be thanks to divine sponsorship.  The child, in turn, can arrive at that point in which he 
or she can affirm the goodness of the invitation’s acceptance.  In doing so, I suggest, the believer 
in providence can see a ratification of a decision made on behalf of the child by the creator in 
providentially orchestrating fertilization.  Human reproduction is not just a biological act nor is it 
a biological act together with a theological act.  Rather, it is a human act that deploys personal 
biological agents and avails itself of the personal theological power.  The term procreation 
expresses the fact that human sexual reproduction is charged with such personal significance.
44
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